The three game series with the White Sox was closer than many expected, each game competitive. And to some this felt like the Padres were playing down to their competition. But the Padres came away with the home sweep. And watching the series you saw several Padres adjustments, both in game and between games, that were anything but playing down to the competition.
Game 1
The opener saw Garrett Crochet square off against Joe Musgrove. One thing that was abundantly clear was that the White Sox are not a 117 loss team when Crochet is pitching. He was electric. The most impressive pitch was the sinker which he ran up to 99 MPH and averaged 17.1 inches of horizontal break, 2 inches more than his season average. You can see its effect:
Pitches that fast don’t usually break that much. Profar’s reaction says it all. Crochet’s season has been interesting. Crochet made it known at the trade deadline he did not want to pitch in the postseason without a contract extension. He ended up not getting traded to a contender. He will not be pitching for a Padres opponent in the playoffs.
The opening game also saw Joe Musgrove for the second time since a disastrous 4th inning against the Giants in his last home start. He shut out the White Sox across six innings, striking out nine and walking none. His average 4-Seam Fastball velocity was again up 0.6 MPH from his season average and topped out at 94.7, very good velo for Musgrove. His spin rates were up across the board:
But it was the sweeper that really stood out. It graded more that two standard deviations from the mean in Stuff+ and showed two more inches of average horizontal break than normal, topping out at a crazy 22 inches. He used it extremely well against the White Sox best hitter Andrew Vaughn in the first inning:
But the real indicator was the Vaughn’s sixth inning at bat. This was the third time through the order when starting pitchers’ ERAs tend to balloon. By then each batter has seen several pitches and gotten more comfortable with the pitcher’s timing. That’s why it was so interesting to see what Musgrove showed Vaughn the third time through. Musgrove’s sequence was curve, sweeper, sweeper, cutter, curve, and then sweeper again:
After Vaughn struck out on a sweeper his first at bat Musgrove went to it three more times in his third at bat. Vaughn never figured it out. You can see in the slow motion replay of the final pitch how much that pitch moves. That’s a major league out pitch.
Musgrove was able to use terrific location on his curveball to set up his fastball. His approach to Andrew Benintendi in the fourth stood out:
Musgrove painted a curve on the upper corner on the outer half of the plate forcing Benintendi to respect the possibility he could drop another curve out there. Instead Musgrove puts a 94 MPH 4-seam fastball in the same location and Benintendi is very late on it.
You never want to hand-waive away bad outcomes as just fluky bad luck without reason. But Musgrove has made fours starts now in September. In three of them he’s pitched six innings of shutout baseball with eight strikeouts or more. In the other outing he was pitching a perfect game through three innings before giving up five runs on the next six pitches. His underlying stuff looks better than it did last season. It’s looking more and more like the fourth inning on September 8th was a bit anomalous. He’s been outstanding before and since.
The Padres would take a tenuous 2-0 lead into the 9th when Robert Suarez came on to attempt the save. He got the first two outs before walking Gavin Sheets after a nine pitch at bat. The batter in the on deck circle was Lenyn Sosa who was able to watch Suarez throw those nine pitches before starting a nine pitch at bat of his own. Sosa would get to Suarez in the ninth pitch of the at bat. This was a very different home run from those of Austin Meadows and Heliot Ramos earlier in the month. Meadows’ home run was a wall scraper to opposite field from a hitter in survival mode. Ramos’ home run was came way of a deliberate opposite field power approach. Sosa’s home run was a dead pull nuke, the byproduct of having completely timed Suarez’ delivery and seeing the same velocity over and over. There was a clue something was wrong as the at bat went on. It can be helpful to watch Sosa’s swings mature. Here’s the first swing Sosa took with the count 1-1:
He’s a little late. His bat speed was a pedestrian 69.1 MPH, a slightly defensive swing, slower than his season average of 71.6 MPH.
He would foul off two more pitches with the count 2-2:
The swings are getting better. The second swing in that clip was 70.4 MPH. Not quite to his season average but closer, and his mechanics are clearly becoming more comfortable, less defensive. Now watch the swing Sosa took on the seventh pitch of the at bat pitch:
That was a clean mechanical swing. It reached a bat speed of 76.9 MPH. Sosa was locking in on Suarez’ timing and didn’t have to swing as defensively. By the seventh pitch of the at bat Sosa had demonstrated he had Suarez’ fastball timing down cold and could get to very good swing mechanics to generate good bat speed. And similarly to the sequence against Meadows and Ramos, Suarez did not change tack. The eighth pitch was another fastball but off the plate running the count full. Here is the ninth pitch of the at bat:
Contrary to the home runs to Meadows and Ramos, this home run was pulled. You can see in the replay Sosa is teeing off, fully in sync with Suarez’ fastball:
That was a 100.7 MPH fastball whose effectiveness had been neutralized by the hitter’s timing.
Here’s the entire sequence start to finish:
When broken down this way you can see the decreasing effectiveness of the fastball velocity as Sosa times it up. This allows Sosa not only a better opportunity to barrel the pitch, but allows him to get his mechanics perfectly in sync to the point he gets off an elite bat speed that’s more typical of a power hitter like Manny Machado.
Suarez needs a plan for when at bats go this way and there are signs a hitter is keying in on his fastball.
Suarez would get the final out of the inning but the game was tied 2-2.
The Padres would threaten to walk it off in the bottom of the 9th with runners on first and third and only one out.
Tyler Wade was again on third base in a similar situation as the 10th inning of game two of the Astros series. In person you could see Wade took a far less risk averse lead from third this time. It was very difficult to see this on the broadcast but here’s a glimpse when the camera briefly panned to Wade:
The situation wasn’t exactly the same as it was when Wade took a vanishingly small lead from third against the Astros. The pitcher was left handed this time. There was one out. The third baseman was a little farther from the bag. Still, it was a noticeable change.
Luis Arraez was at the plate in a situation where a single wins the game. Singles hitters and batting average in general are much derided in the modern game. But you can understand why in certain situations there’s no one you’d rather have at the plate than Arraez. However, the Padres ran into some misfortune:
That’s usually a game winning base hit. Instead the White Sox survived to extra innings.
In the top of the 10th Tyler Wade stayed in to play second base. The White Sox advanced their free runner to third with one out when Wade made an excellent defensive play:
Wade takes a split second to gather himself and ensure the throw was on the money. No panic. Just concentration.
Morejon would get a strikeout to end the inning. No runs scored.
In the bottom of the 10th the Padres would elect to pinch run Brandon Lockridge as the Manfred Man. Lockridge’s speed is elite. His presence on second base in a tied game in the bottom of the 10th was again a situation where a base hit likely wins the game. That’s why it was interesting to see Fernando Tatis’ approach at the plate:
Last week against the Astros Tatis had been up to bat in the bottom of the 10th trailing 4-3 with runners on first and third and one out. He fell behind 0-2, and this was his two strike swing:
Against the Astros Tatis might have been playing hero ball. You cannot know this with certainty - his intent is not in the box score. But you can get clues to his intent. His bat speed was very fast, a 75.5 MPH, with a long swing length of 7.9 feet. That’s a swing meant to do damage.
Here’s the replay of this Friday’s opposite field game winner:
That was a compact 72.8 MPH swing with a short swing length of 7.1 feet. Mike Shildt would go out of the way to praise Tatis in the postgame press conference for his opposite field approach when the game called for it. Tatis is a sublime hitter and he can get to incredible bat speeds. You want him to be trying to reach that elite power most of the time. But it looked like he shortened up with intent in this at bat where simply connecting with a base hit was likely to be as good as a home run.
Game 2
Game two most resembled the expected outcome of a clash of two teams with a significant gulf in class. Martin Perez would pitch well and the offense scored early. Jackson Merrill singled to start the 2nd inning and Xander Bogaerts would drive him in with a two run home run. David Peralta would later hit a solo home run and Merrill would add an RBI single to give the Padres a 4-0 lead into the 6th. The White Sox would chip away to make it 4-1 heading into the 8th against Jason Adam. Adam would struggle, though some credit should be given to the White Sox hitters for tough at bats. Adam would give up a run and leave the bases loaded with only one out. He was ahead in the count 0-2, 1-2, and 0-2 to the three batters that reached by walk/HBP. With the Padres leading 4-2 and the bases loaded with only one out Tanner Scott was brought in. He induced a double play to get out of the inning. Elias Diaz would hit a two run home run in the top of the ninth to give the Padres a 6-2 lead. Scott would stay in for the ninth and secure the five-out save. It wasn’t clear whether Scott’s appearance signified a change in the closer role.
Game 3
Having won the first two games of the series the Padres had pushed the White Sox to 119 losses. One away from the modern record. Yu Darvish was pitching and was very good. He would hold the White Sox to 2 runs on two solo home runs across 6.1 innings while striking out nine and walking none. He was locating pitches extremely well leading to strikeouts:
Courtesy: @PitchingNinja
He also showed off his vintage curveball. This is an interesting pitch because he rarely throws it in the zone, but it gets a ton of chase. And you can see why:
The ball hangs in the hitter’s vision for so long it’s hard to lay off. But it drops almost to the ground by the time it’s crossing the plate. Darvish induced a 57% chase rate on his curve Sunday.
His pitches scored well by stuff+ metrics:
Yu Darvish has looked good, and he’s gotten good results in back to back games. There’s little reason to think he can’t be effective. It’s interesting to consider his role in the rotation given how well Dylan Cease, Michael King, and Joe Musgrove have been pitching. He should get one more start before the season is over.
Jeremiah Estrada pitched an interesting eighth retiring all three batters. But what was really notable was his pitch mix and underlying pitch metrics:
Estrada’s fastball velocity was noticeably up, and he threw only one splitter (chitter). Estrada faced full counts against Jacob Amaya and Miguel Vargas and opted to go with the slider as the put away pitch both times, and both times executed perfectly:
It’s easy to forget Estrada suffered a mid-season illness that saw him lose a significant amount of body weight, and he’d been struggling to get back to his early season 98-99 MPH 4-seamer velocity. Sunday suggests he’s returning to form. His slider was up to 92.3 MPH. That’s a really hard slider. And he was dotting it. There was a period of the season in which Estrada was every bit the reliever Jason Adam, Tanner Scott, and Robert Suarez have been. Estrada finding that form again would be quite a tailwind for the Padres.
Despite good pitching on the day, the Padres trailed 2-1 heading to the bottom of the eighth. Donovan Solano led off with a double down the left field line. Tyler Wade would run for Solano. Luis Arraez had started the day on the bench to rest an ailing knee, but was available to pinch hit. Mike Shildt immediately sent him in to replace Kyle Higashioka. The White Sox would counter with their best lefty. The White Sox as a team are very bad, but they have some good players, including Fraser Ellard
This was another situation where a high batting average hitter was a lot more valuable due to the game context. Luis Arraez did what he does best:
The double would tie the game 2-2. The Padres would pinch run for Arraez with the blazing fast Brandon Lockridge. Jurickson Profar was up next and took the most interesting at bat of the weekend. He entered his at bat with a runner on second in a tie game and this was his swing at the first pitch:
This was 76.6 MPH bat speed. That’s an all out power swing for Profar who averages a 71.8 MPH bat speed. And it was a good swing decision, he got a very good pitch to hit. He just didn’t quite square it up. But after this pitch the situation changed in two important ways. First, he took a tough called strike two. Then after fouling off two pitches, Ellard would throw a wild pitch allowing Brandon Lockridge to take third. This set up a very different situation for Profar. There was now a runner on third with no outs, meaning a ball in play could lead to a run via productive out. He also had two strikes meaning a swing and miss would end his at bat with an unproductive out. After working the count to 2-2, what happened next looked like a mode-switch from Profar:
This was a 67.8 MPH contact swing, an ultra short swing length of 6.9 feet. Profar’s intent isn’t in the box score. You have to infer from watching the game. But it looks like he switched from damage mode to contact mode as the situation changed pitch to pitch. And he executed a productive at bat. He got the Padres the lead.
We’ve written a lot about clutch hitting as a skill, the premise of which is using the information that you gather through the course of a game to make optimal swing decisions. This discussion often involves shortening up for contact if that is likely to lead to a run scoring that has an inordinate amount of win probability attached to it, making sacrificing a bit of power a good tradeoff. But there is absolutely a time to swing for the fences. Fernando Tatis Jr. was up next in a game the Padres now led by one with one out and the bases empty. This is a perfect situation for a power hitter to swing away, try for extra bases or a nuke. Tatis completely understood this. After shortening up in game one to get the walk-off base hit, Tatis unleashed his A-swing on first pitch of the at bat:
That was a powerful 78.1 MPH swing. He swung through it but it was a good swing decision. Tatis would take a slider for a strike to run the count to 0-2. Here’s the two strike approach he opted for Sunday:
That was an upper echelon bat speed of 80.1 MPH. There’s a time to shorten up and avoid the strikeout. And there’s a time where a strikeout really isn’t much different from an out on a ball in play. With a hitter like Tatis, capable of doing damage like few players in the league can, you want him to be ok striking out a little more if it means a little more of this. But you want him to recognize the situation. Tatis demonstrated that ability thoroughly this series. He gave the Padres a 4-2 lead going into the 9th. A save situation.
Changing It Up
There were questions about Tanner Scott taking the closer role after game two, but Robert Suarez got the call again game three, and his approach was interesting. On his first pitch he induced a weak grounder from Luis Robert who was late on the sinker for the first out. Suarez then started Andrew Benintendi with an 88 MPH changeup that was high and outside. He followed with a 98 MPH 4-seamer that also missed. before the third pitch of the at bat it looked like Suarez shook off the first pitch Elias Diaz suggested on pitch com:
We can’t know what the original pitch call was but Suarez and Diaz elected for another 4-seamer. This one was in the zone and Benintendi wasn’t close.
Suarez followed this with a 100 MPH sinker that Benintendi was again late on:
Benintendi at this point had seen four straight fastballs. But he also hadn’t shown any ability to catch up to it. And maybe that’s why Suarez gave him as pure a challenge as you will ever see on the final pitch:
Suarez has gotten burned lately when hitters have seen numerous consecutive fastballs without any meaningful sequencing, and have timed him up after fouling off pitch after pitch. In this at bat Benintendi never seemed to be getting closer to squaring it up. This was an bat that started with a changeup. It’s hard to know if that was in the back of Benintendi’s mind, or if he just couldn’t catch up even though he knew a fastball was coming.
Suarez would change the pace with the next hitter. Suarez started off Andrew Vaughn with a cutter that was only 93 MPH. It worked in a sense: Vaughn rolled over it. But Vaughn reached on an infield single despite a spectacular effort by Xander Bogaerts:
This would set up the identical scenario as game one: Bottom of the ninth, two outs, tying run at the plate. Gavin Sheets had seen nine pitches from Suarez including six fastballs in game one, ultimately drawing a walk. Suarez didn’t switch up, he started the at bat with three straight fast balls, Sheets put a very good swing on the second offering but fouled it off. On the fourth pitch of the at bat Suarez did finally change it up, but he bounced his change up badly and Sheets wasn’t tempted:
This was a moment where you wondered if the reason Suarez had been so reliant on his fastball was that he lacked change up command. He lacked confidence in the pitch. And that thought is what made the next pitch so gratifying:
Suarez earned the save with a devastating change up that completely fooled Gavin Sheets. Suarez made adjustments after his recent failures. He added some pitch sequencing and the change up to Sheets was a difference maker. It induced an uncompetitive swing from a hitter who had seen many offerings from Suarez across the series. This isn’t much sample size, but it looked like proof of concept.
Series Win
The Sweep was yet another series win and gave the Padres 90 wins on the season. It also set up a very unlikely scenario. The Padres are actually able to guarantee a division win if they sweep the Dodgers and Diamondbacks to end the season. It’s extremely unlikely that the Dodgers and Diamondbacks would allow sweeps at home. But even the mere possibility of such a scenario was impossible to imagine at the beginning of the season.
Beating the White Sox may have sounded trivial on paper, but they played hard and didn’t go down without a fight. The loss Sunday tied the White Sox with the 1962 Mets for the worst record in modern MLB history. The White Sox couldn’t stave off their fate the way the 2003 Detroit Tigers did. Of course they had a much tougher opponent.
Some will feel that because the games were close the Padres were playing down to their competition. It didn’t seem like it. The difference in the series was the class of the players, the quality of the concentration, the adjustments made throughout the series, and especially the adjustments made moment to moment within the games. They were locked in.
The Padres are in the very last stretch of the season. They will face the Dodgers in Los Angeles Tuesday. And every game still counts. Every game is still relevant.
The White Sox have the fewest runs scored and the most runs allowed, which leads to a historically bad record. But their pitching, both starters and relievers, was pretty good. Their offense was pretty bad, lots of guys in .500s and .600s in OPS, no one above .800. The Padres never really got it going on offense but their pitching, with a few too many HRs, held it together.
Might have been closer than we'd have liked, but the Sox were incentivized to play harder than they have been all season. 3 W's is all that matters, and the NLW crown not being out of reach the final week of the season is all you can ask for. Who knows what happens when the Dodgers enter the Twilight Zone that is Coors, and the Padres are forcing them to play hard all the way to the end.