What The Hell Did I Just Watch?
A Baseball team’s outlook is much harder to prognosticate than teams in other sports. The starter at the most heliocentric position changes every night. The most heavily used pitchers still play in less than half of a team’s games. Hitters only get 4-5 at bats per game despite it taking over 900 at bats for batting average to stabilize, and over 450 at bats for on base percentage to stabilize. And baseball games are very short leading to volatile outcomes. With this being the baseline, stretches like the incredibly convoluted last week of Padres baseball naturally leave fans asking the same question…
What The Hell Did I Just Watch?
The past eight days saw a five game losing streak in which the Padres scored a total of 11 runs, followed by an offensive explosion of 23 runs across two resounding wins, and finally a 9-3 drubbing featuring the evisceration of a promising rookie pitcher. There were some incredibly promising signs. Fernando Tatis Jr is playing like the MVP he’s been in years past. Matt Waldron is filling out the rotation in desperate need of innings. And promising rookie pitcher Adam Mazur made one start where he didn’t get eviscerated. But injury concerns are adding up. Already missing Xander Bogaerts, the infield was without Manny Machado for multiple games forcing awkward defensive assignments that led to at least three pivotal plays where an out wasn’t made because the first baseman was too short (one of those first basemen was 5’8, a feat only accomplished by six other first basemen in MLB history). The week also featured multiple bunts for some reason. It is not possible to neatly package this pandemonium. But there’s reason to think some of this anarchic stretch was an unsustainable outlier, and there is one emerging theme that appears to be a defining characteristic of the 2024 Padres that we’ll do our best to articulate.
Unsustainable
To start last week the Padres lost five games in a row, an abominable outcome. But across those five games they essentially demonstrated half of the championship formula: elite run prevention. They allowed an average of 3.4 runs/game in those five losses, a mark that would only trail the absurd Yankees 3.28 runs/game for best in baseball. But they scored only 2.2 runs/game in those matchups, a mark that would be well below the league worst White Sox 3.08 runs/game. Neither of those trends appears representative of the team, nor sustainable across the season. Clearly there were some unusual things happening. It’s likely that some of the offensive struggle was variance that’s beyond the team’s control... But not everything. And as always it’s those things within their control that deserve special attention.
Aggression
The losing streak was punctuated by several base running gaffes. One that got a lot of attention was Luis Arraez getting thrown out trying to go first to third on an infield single with no outs:
Another was Fernando Tatis getting picked off second base attempting to steal third off Slade Cecconi with one out in the third inning. Cecconi had already used a disengagement and it appeared Tatis was possible trying to time his delivery:
These were momentum killing plays in close games that meaningfully contributed to the losing streak. Something these two plays had in common is they were made entirely by the players trying to seek out an advantage on the base paths through aggression. The team has consistently preached an aggressive philosophy in taking extra bases. And indeed this philosophy would seem to pair nicely with a team expecting a lot of singles, where taking an extra base can help make up for some of the missing slug. It might follow that making some extra outs on the base paths is the cost of doing business. But there was another base running gaffe that proved to be a crucial moment in the losing streak that was not due to an instinctive choice made by a player.
Situational Awareness
Here’s a key sequence from the second game of the losing streak: tied 1-1 in the sixth inning with Jurickson Profar on first base and one out Fernando Tatis laced a double into the left field corner:
The camera angle makes it look like a closer play than it was. Here are the key still frames that show third base coach Tim Leiper’s vantage when he sent Profar home (as captured by @TooMuchMortons_):
The relay throw home is already being made when Profar is maybe 15% of the way home. There’s absolutely no doubt Leiper knew the decision to send the runner was going to be risky. Being very generous, maybe he saw it as a 50/50 gamble. It might seem unfair to criticize the decision based on still frames of a fast developing play that in the heat of the moment might have seemed close to a 50/50 play. While it’s true that fast developing plays can require snap judgements, no snap judgement was required here. There is no reason to take even a 50/50 risk in this situation. Had Profar been held at third the situation would have been runners on second and third with one out, a base/out scenario that carries a 1.352 run expectancy for the inning and an almost 70% chance of scoring at least the runner from third. The next batter up was Manny Machado, who had already hit a home run off pitcher Tyler Anderson earlier in the game. That should have incrementally pushed the threshold to send Profar even higher. The only reason to send Profar is if Leiper felt he had a greater than 70% chance of scoring, and there is simply no way he thought that from his vantage point. The send/don’t send calculus often revolves around the 50/50 odds of scoring, and it can be very difficult to tell if the runner has a better than 50% chance of beating a throw in the heat of the moment. But it’s much easier to determine if a player has better than a 70% chance to score. Those plays are fairly obvious. The cognitive strain is much less: if the play looks close at all just hold the runner. But it requires being situationally aware.
This isn’t being unfair to the Padres or to Leiper. Every play in baseball is a set piece, which allows for strategic planning before plays develop. It was strategically correct before the play developed for Leiper to have in mind that Profar should be held if there was any doubt about his ability to score from third on an extra base hit. The thing is, although this was only one play, it very much suggests that a rigorous situational calculus isn’t part of the process. Instead the Padres were shooting from the hip, even the coaches operating on instinct.
Guardrails
The Padres lead MLB in going first to third on a single, and scoring from first on a double, plays that require base running aggression. Their focus on being aggressive and allowing their players to be instinctive has led to some very real successes:
Courtesy: @Padres
Tatis' brilliance on this play won’t show up in the box score but he purposefully slid into an empty base to block a throw to home and sow chaos that allowed him to score. This is what the team wants from its runners: heat of the moment recognition and audacity. But it’s good to have guardrails. Arraez and Tatis’ outs on the base paths during the losing streak were made using instincts nudged by a philosophy of aggression, and when it comes to individual player conditioning it is hard to instill a rigorous situational calculus. That’s not the same standard a base coach should be held to. Baseball is a game that permits forethought. And forethought paired with situational awareness is the value proposition of a base coach. That wasn’t present in a game the Padres ultimately lost 2-1. And nearly halfway through the season it’s fair to ask why. These are marginal decision affecting fractions of win probability at a time, but in what is looking like one of the closest wild card playoff races in memory, getting those marginal decisions right across 162 games could very well be the difference. The Padres can control some of these decisions. And they aren’t. They’re near the top of the league in getting picked off, and in making outs on the bases in general. They need to figure out which of those outs are avoidable, and that starts with accountability from the brass.
Still In The Hunt
The upshot is despite going 2-6 over their last eight games they are still in sole possession of the second wild card spot. But there are seven teams within a game and a half of closing in:
It doesn’t get any closer than that. Last week was a missed opportunity. But also another week survived, still in the hunt. It’s been white knuckle baseball all season and there’s no sign that’s going to stop.