In the Baserunning Out 2 section, wouldn't the run expectancy or the two situations already take the out into account? Comparing the run value of the out to the run differential of the two baserunning situations seems like it's double dipping on the value of the out.
Also -- and maybe this is getting pedantic -- but the value of a single out is hugely different depending on WHICH out it is. The third out of an inning is far more consequential than the previous two. So even if the comparison is sound, this seems like an instance where we're ignoring the specifics of the situation, which I know you've written about a bunch lately :)
Profar's out at second was the third out of the inning. If you want to assign a situationally specific run value to that it would make sense to use the full 0.51 run expectancy if he hadn't tried for second base.
What I was getting at is the value of an average out in Coors is a lot more than in a run neutral environment and that implies having a different mindset about risk tolerance on the basepaths, and an average run value is more useful to that argument than the situationally specific run value in Profar's first base running out, but you're right that a third out with runners still on base should be treated as a bigger deal at a granular level.
I tend to think it's hard to make adjustments like that in game because these decisions are such snap judgements and the margin of error is usually fractions of a second. That section was more of a comment around a general mindset about risk tradeoffs, and it's possible that doesn't translate well to actual in game adjustments. As opposed to the later pickoff which is something that can be hedged against with a deliberate process change.
For sure, and honestly the post taken as a whole largely excuses the padres for a couple of mistakes and a fair amount of bad luck, which I agree with. I just felt like comparing the run expectancy delta to the run value of an out was apples and oranges. Though I also didn't notice that was a third out as well. I almost wonder if there's more pressure when there are two outs to take risks just to "squeeze out" one last run before the inning is over, even if the statistical logic doesn't quite bear out.
i'd argue that profar stretching to second is actually the wrong decision in that scenario even if he had had a better chance of being safe. if he stays at first, bryce johnson is at third which would be a perfect scenario for profar to steal second on the first pitch of the next at bat. this puts extra pressure on a catcher making his major league debut and with two outs he may be tempted to throw to second which would allow bryce to break for home but even if he doesnt then you have second and third anyway
In the Baserunning Out 2 section, wouldn't the run expectancy or the two situations already take the out into account? Comparing the run value of the out to the run differential of the two baserunning situations seems like it's double dipping on the value of the out.
Also -- and maybe this is getting pedantic -- but the value of a single out is hugely different depending on WHICH out it is. The third out of an inning is far more consequential than the previous two. So even if the comparison is sound, this seems like an instance where we're ignoring the specifics of the situation, which I know you've written about a bunch lately :)
Profar's out at second was the third out of the inning. If you want to assign a situationally specific run value to that it would make sense to use the full 0.51 run expectancy if he hadn't tried for second base.
What I was getting at is the value of an average out in Coors is a lot more than in a run neutral environment and that implies having a different mindset about risk tolerance on the basepaths, and an average run value is more useful to that argument than the situationally specific run value in Profar's first base running out, but you're right that a third out with runners still on base should be treated as a bigger deal at a granular level.
I tend to think it's hard to make adjustments like that in game because these decisions are such snap judgements and the margin of error is usually fractions of a second. That section was more of a comment around a general mindset about risk tradeoffs, and it's possible that doesn't translate well to actual in game adjustments. As opposed to the later pickoff which is something that can be hedged against with a deliberate process change.
For sure, and honestly the post taken as a whole largely excuses the padres for a couple of mistakes and a fair amount of bad luck, which I agree with. I just felt like comparing the run expectancy delta to the run value of an out was apples and oranges. Though I also didn't notice that was a third out as well. I almost wonder if there's more pressure when there are two outs to take risks just to "squeeze out" one last run before the inning is over, even if the statistical logic doesn't quite bear out.
i'd argue that profar stretching to second is actually the wrong decision in that scenario even if he had had a better chance of being safe. if he stays at first, bryce johnson is at third which would be a perfect scenario for profar to steal second on the first pitch of the next at bat. this puts extra pressure on a catcher making his major league debut and with two outs he may be tempted to throw to second which would allow bryce to break for home but even if he doesnt then you have second and third anyway
This a really interesting way of looking at it, I tend to agree that this nudges the calculus even further towards not risking an out at second