It's Time To Talk About Carp
We're not using the depth we have
Prior to Saturday, the Padres had started 17 games using a non-rotation pitcher (Ryan Weathers started 10, Nick Martinez 4, Matt Waldron 1, Reiss Knehr 1, Adrian Morejon 1). They went 6-11 in those games. On Saturday, the Padres promoted Jackson Wolf from AA, and his start became the 18th game from a non-rotation starter. Wolf gave up three runs in the second, but he steadied himself and completed five not-too-shabby innings. And “not-too-shabby” was more than enough, because the offense went supernova and scored 14 runs. The 14-3 blowout included the first real breakout from Luis Campusano, who went 4 for 5 with a mammoth homerun.
But they gave away a game on Sunday, losing 3-1 after another abysmal offensive performance.
Some felt that Luis Campusano’s big Saturday represented a step forward that could give the Padres an offensive boost without having to make a roster move. If Campusano can hit consistently, it would allow the Padres to play both Gary Sanchez and Campusano in the same lineup, one at C and one at DH, to address the two weakest spots in the Padres lineup.
Thus, many were bewildered to see Matt Carpenter in the lineup at DH Sunday. But there’s likely a simple explanation for this choice: Campusano and Sanchez are the only catchers on the Padres roster, which makes it risky to play them in the same lineup. The DH rule specifies that if the player slotted to DH switches to a position in the field, the team forfeits the DH position for the rest of the game, forcing pitchers to hit. If, for example, Sanchez started at catcher and Campusano started at DH, and midway through the game Sanchez has to come out, Campusano could switch from DH to catcher, but the Padres would lose the DH for the rest of the game. Pitchers would have to hit, which might be charmingly retro but is definitely not good baseball.
If the possibility of Brent Honeywell coming to the plate at a crucial spot in the 9th inning bothers you – as it should – then you might think putting Carpenter at DH instead of Campusano is the safe move. But how does the risk of Sanchez getting injured compare to the risk of Matt Carpenter simply being Matt Carpenter? A bit of scrutiny suggests the decision to start Carpenter might have been riskier.
A 2015 study of the epidemiology of MLB catcher injuries suggested the average injury rate was about 2.75 injuries per 1000 games1 or 0.28%. A more recent study on a smaller sample suggested the injury rate could be up to 0.40%. The studies use different bodies of data and identify a very similar injury rate. This is a pretty reasonable approximation of the risk of the Padres having to deal with pitchers hitting in a game.
How bad would it be if a pitcher had to hit? Well…bad. Prior to the universal DH in 2022, modern velocity had decimated pitchers’ ability to hit. In 2019, the average National League pitcher batted .131 with a .329 OPS. Carp has been bad, but he hasn’t been pitcher-trying-to-hit bad, batting .169 with a .604 OPS.
So, that’s what it looks like if Campusano is in the DH spot and Sanchez gets hurt, but what if Sanchez doesn’t get hurt? And let’s remember: This is the scenario with a 99.6% probability. Carp’s OPS is .604. Campusano’s body of work in the majors isn’t large, but he’s young (24), consistently hit in the minors, and has a .742 OPS this year in the big leagues. And all his tools were on display Saturday:
Video Source: @Padres
Campusano’s power is real. On Saturday’s broadcast, Tony Gwynn Jr. compared his swing to Prince Fielder, noting the similar high finish. There might be more apt comparisons, but you can see what he meant (and credit to Gwynn for overlooking the lefty/righty difference). Campusano does not project to be as prodigious on offense as Fielder, but the best-case projection isn’t actually as important as the worst-case projection: Campusano’s body of work is probably large enough to set the floor on any negative projection. His 129 major league plate appearances have produced a cumulative OPS of .579, that is not significantly worse than Carp.
So to summarize: The risk of playing Campusano and Sanchez in the same lineup is about a 0.28-0.40% chance a pitcher has to hit, and pitchers hit worse than Carp but not by as much as you might think. On the other hand, the risk of playing Carp is the difference in production between him and Campusano, and that risk is additive on a per-game basis. There’s almost no chance that Campusano will be worse than Carp; there’s a good chance that he will be significantly better.
A very back-of-the-envelope calculation might look like this: Using weight runs created per plate appearance, Luis Campusano thus far is creating about 0.108 runs per PA. Matt Carpenter is creating about 0.083 runs per PA. If these performances are sustained, prorated across the remainder of the season (248 PAs): Campusano would create 26.8 runs, Carp would create 20.5 runs. The difference of 6.3 runs is worth about .65 extra wins across the remaining 62 games. Playing Campusano instead of Carp might scratch out one extra win in a season that could very well come down to one single game.
This calculation isn’t meant to be exhaustive, but it a more comprehensive assessment of risk than simply worrying about what happens if Sanchez gets hurt while Campusano is at DH. At first blush, putting both catchers in the lineup seems like a risky move. But there’s probably more risk to playing Carpenter than Campusano.
The decision looks worse when you consider the venue in which the decision was made: Detroit is cavernous. Comerica Park is actually the worst hitters park in MLB when it comes to hitting home runs. Carp has never hit a homerun in Comerica Park.
The decision to play Carpenter on Sunday looks worse when you consider that the game was played in the cavernous Comerica Park. Comerica is the worst hitters park in MLB when it comes to hitting home runs. Carp has never hit a home run in Comerica Park.
It’s been five years since Carpenter hit the ball hard consistently. 2018 was his last full season putting up an OPS+ over 100 (a stellar 143). That season, he hit 33% (136/410) of batted balls with an exit velocity (EV) greater than 100 MPH. In 2023, his OPS+ is a tragic 71,and he’s hit only 26% (29/111) of batted balls with an exit velocity above 100 MPH. His average EV is down 2.7 MPH from a year ago. This problem is compounded by a strikeout rate that has climbed to 29.1%, which is right in line with his averages in his terrible 2019-2021 campaigns. This is the profile of a player in physical decline: He has a harder time hitting the ball and hits it softly when he does make contact. This is in line with physiologic expectations for a 37, soon to be 38 year old athlete. He’s at the age where a player’s physical tools often leave him, and there’s not much precedent for players regaining tools at that age except for steroids.
The question to be asked at this point is whether Matt Carpenter’s contract is a sunk cost. If it is, the team would be better off divesting and reallocating remaining resources. Carpenter has negative trade value; the Padres won’t get anything for him in a trade. His contract is for 2 years $12 million ($6.5 million this year with a player option he is likely to exercise for $5.5 million in 2024).
Signing Matt Carpenter was a gamble based on a very small sample size. He raked for 47 games in 2022. It seems like A.J. Preller likes to make these types of gambles. Austin Nola was traded for after slugging a .903 OPS in 29 games for the Mariners in 2020. We suspect the logic Preller is following in these types of deals is: If the player is exhibiting results indicative of their underlying skill, they will eventually play themselves off the market. That is: The Mariners weren’t going to trade Nola if it became clear that he could sustain a .903 OPS. Matt Carpenter wasn’t going to be available for 2 years $12 million if it became clear that he’d regained his stroke and was a 143 OPS+ slugger once again. The only possibility of getting players like that is to take on the risk that the player’s performance is an unsustainable mirage.
To be clear we were not fans of either the Nola trade or the Carpenter signing, but we’re trying to understand A.J.’s approach to the risk involved in those deals. At this point the uncertainty has been removed and a mountain of evidence suggests the performances of Nola and Carp that piqued A.J.’s interest were unsustainable. It seems that the level they’re playing at now is their level. Nola has been rightly sent down to AAA, thus freeing up the resources that had been allocated to him (roster spot, PAs). Carp does not have the same minor league options. Carp is using resources: PAs and a roster spot that need to be given to the player most likely to help the Padres survive the 62-game crucible that’s left between now and the postseason.
When a team’s GM is on the hot seat – as Preller is thought to be – fans worry that a desperate GM might make panic moves that hurt the team. This fear doesn’t come from nowhere; people have been known to make rash decisions in a bid for self-preservation. One type of rash decision is a desperate bid for short-term success (think trading Ethan Salas for Paul Goldschmidt). Another irrational move is to refuse to admit a mistake, i.e. a refusal to admit that a cost is sunk.
Matt Carpenter getting 206 PAs (and counting) feels like a refusal to admit a mistake.
This is where one might argue that Peter Seidler’s focus on organizational stability could be a good thing for the 2023 Padres. Seidler’s faith in Preller could allow Preller to acknowledge a sunk cost without having to worry that he’s going to lose his job for admitting a mistake. There’s value in not having your GM feel like the sword of Damocles is constantly swinging above his head. But if Preller won’t acknowledge a sunk cost, then that value is negated. Carpenter’s statcast data, statistical analysis, and eye test all suggest that his contract is a sunk cost. The fact that the Padres keep putting him on the field suggests either a disagreement about this assessment or a refusal to acknowledge it.
The best case scenario for the Padres is that we’re simply wrong about Carpenter, and he’ll be better for the rest of the year. Maybe this is what the Padres think will happen. If they do, think that, well…we hope they’re right! We would love to be wrong about this. But if we’re not wrong, then it’s time to cut bait on Carp before he drags us underwater with him.
Note that the study used data from 2001 to 2010 which was prior to the implementation of the ‘Buster Posey’ rule prohibiting collisions at the plate. Of the 134 catcher injuries in the study, 20 (15%) were due to collisions likely to have been prevented by the ‘Buster Posey’ rule. Thus catcher injury rates in 2023 may very well be lower. Also note the data is drawn from ‘Athlete Exposures’ which can include either practices or games.